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Medical Liability Reform in the United States:
A Comprehensive Approach to Medical Error
James Gerard Muller

Medical liability, also referred to as “medical malpractice,” is a form of professional
negligence in which the treatment a health care provider administers falls below the accepted
standard of practice in the medical community, thereby causing injury or death to a patient. In
the United States, malpractice is resolved through the process of litigation. If a patient has reason
to believe he or she is a victim of malpractice, the patient has the legal ability to file a lawsuit.
The legal remedy patient-plaintiffs seek is monetary compensation, measured by “economic
loss” or financial loss and damage suffered by a person (Kessler 93–110). For a physiciandefendant to be convicted of malpractice, the plaintiff’s counsel carries the burden of proving:
(1) the relationship between the plaintiff (patient) and defendant (physician) gave rise to a duty,
(2) the defendant was negligent—meaning his care fell below the standard expected, (3) the
plaintiff suffered an injury, and (4) the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence (Mello,
Studdert 11–12).
Medical liability insurance is a commodity health care providers purchase in the event
that they need to compensate a patient. Medical liability crises are understood as the result of
sharp rises in the cost of liability insurance premiums for health care providers. In recent years,
roughly from the years 2002–2005, the United States has experienced a malpractice crisis (Sloan
and Chepke). What exactly created the recent medical liability insurance crisis remains in
dispute.
Medical malpractice and medical liability insurance have been the topic of American
policy debate from time to time. The topic’s prevalence in American politics and policy debate
result from a unanimous agreement among policy makers, scholars, physicians, and the educated
public, that the medical malpractice system as it stands, is operating inadequately. There has
been a general agreement as to what the central flaws of the current medical liability system are:
(1) heavy financial burdens associated with insurance and (2) a disregard for patient safety and
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reducing medical error. Admittedly, these problems are prioritized differently—some view the
financial complications associated with medical liability as the most important concern, whereas
others view medical error and patient safety as what deserves the greatest attention. Before
addressing these concerns with considerable detail, it is first imperative to gain insight on how
the litigation process works.
Malpractice Claims and the Litigation Process
Only 1 in 8 people injured by medical negligence file a malpractice claima, and of those
claims filed, only thirty percent reach court (Mello and Studdert 13). According to the landmark
Harvard Medical Practice Study (1990), only 1 in 15 patients who are victims of malpractice
receive compensation, and many cases awarded compensation have no evidence of negligence
(Kessler 96). Understanding these facts, the problem is obvious: many victims of malpractice are
uncompensated, and the money that is given out does not go to the correct beneficiaries. The
purpose of medical malpractice litigation is to compensate victims, and to deter physicians from
practicing medicine in a complacent manner (Kessler 94; Mello and Studdert 17). Litigation has
failed its purpose of providing compensation to those whom deserve it. In addition, litigation
does not have the deterrent effect many assume it does; as Mello and Studdert have noted, the
deterrent effect of the tort system rests on too many assumptions (17). One of the largest
assumptions, litigation as a form of deterrence, makes is that physicians are always rational
actors, performing some sort of hedonic calculus (Mello and Studdert 18). The second
assumption the deterrence claim makes is that physicians internalize the costs of their own
negligence (18).
Realizing litigation fails in accomplishing its two core purposes, the question that needs
to be asked is: Should the medical malpractice compensation system continue to rely on
litigation? Medical malpractice, placed in the context of litigation, is an adversarial process. Is an
adversarial process in everyone’s best interest? These are important questions policy makers
must ask themselves, and they are questions constituents ought to ask policy makers. As it
stands, malpractice’s confrontational nature is a concern that requires considerable attention, and
will be addressed detail throughout this paper.
Common Misconceptions With Respect to Malpractice

a
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Before addressing the two concerns laid out thus far, it is essential to know what scholars
widely regard as “misconceptions” with respect to medical malpractice. The first, and perhaps
the principal misunderstanding, is that frivolous claims are abundant. “The epidemic is medical
negligence, not lawsuits.” b As already discussed, many victims of negligence do not sue. A
study conducted by researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health found that of 1,400
closed medical negligence claims, 97 % were meritorious.c In many cases, patients are filing
claims in hopes to discover what went wrong during surgery, because the information was not
disclosed by the physician.
The presupposition has been made that malpractice claims drive up health care costs. The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) finds such a claim baseless, with
factual information leading to a contrary finding. “The total spent defending claims and
compensating victims of medical negligence in 2007 was $7.1 billion—just 0.3% of health care
costs,” claims the NAIC.d A similar argument, that malpractice claims drive up doctors’
premiums, has been widely criticized as well. Medical malpractice insurance is not strongly
correlated with experience-rating (history of claims), and many academics and health policy
economists see malpractice premiums influenced by insurance cycles more than anything (Mello
and Studdert 13–14; Sloan and Chepke 27–31).e
Proponents of the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH)
Act of 2012, also referred to as “H.R.5,” support the Congressional Bill on the premise “tort
reform will lower insurance rates, and improve patient access to health care services.”f Ironically,
the Bill’s text seems to protect physicians’ self-interest more than patients. Contrary to the notion
of “improving the liability system for patients,” expressed in the preface of the legislation’s text,
H.R.5 limits a patient’s legal rights by putting damage caps on malpractice lawsuits. It is
assumed a bill with such a high marginal cost, limiting patients’ rights, would produce an even
greater marginal benefit—tort reform lowering insurance rates. The causal relationship between
tort reform and a lower insurance rate has been in serious question for many scholars in the
health policy field. Obviously, if damage caps are in place, insurers will be paying out less
money to victims of malpractice; however, the assumption that they will pass their savings along
b

American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence
Mello & Studdert, Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation
d
American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence
e
American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence
f
(HEALTH) Act of 2012, Introduction
c
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to doctors by lowering premiums is unsupportedg. According to research compiled by the
American Association for Justice, states that have cap damages and states that do not, have little
variance in premiums. The statistics make it clear that the cap-on-damage approach has done
nothing to reduce health care costs.
The final issue regarding misconceptions is the concept of “defensive medicine.” Also
referred to as assurance behavior and avoidance behavior, this term can be understood as the
workups physicians do (and do not do), respectively, that are influenced by liability pressures.
Some scholars in the field, those very adamant about patient safety and strongly in opposition of
tort reform (in other words, the most liberal of health policy scholars), claim defensive medicine
is the biggest myth and largest over-exaggeration in the malpractice policy debate. Another
thought, one that some reports bring to our attention, speculate that what doctors claim to be
defensive medicine may be a way physicians generate income.h Mello and Studdert, whom could
still definitely be characterized as “opposed to tort reform,” are a little more diplomatic in their
approach to defensive medicine, calling it a “slippery concept” and claiming measuring it is
“notoriously difficult” (Mello and Studdert 23). Mello and Studdert make a good point—
defensive medicine is a very hard concept to operationalize; after all, when treating a patient,
where does “high-quality care” end and “liability motivations” begin? Scholars like Daniel P.
Kessler have contributed research on defensive medicine’s prominence that has been largely
disputed by a wide range of colleagues.i With such strong assertions on both ends of the political
spectrum, and with no strong methodological process to measure assurance or avoidance
behavior’s prevalence in medicine, there is no way to truly understand the reality of the
“defensive medicine” concept.
The Facts and Figures of Medical Liability
With no clear consensus on the legitimacy of defensive medicine, perhaps it makes more
sense to draw our attention to the facts well understood about medical liability and defensive
medicine. The fact is, assuming arguendo, that defensive medicine does exist, and it contributes
to health expenditures by as much as $50 billion dollars (a very generous estimate), eliminating
defensive medicine would be nearly impossible. How can policy makers seek eliminating
something of such an abstract form? The supposition is that caps-on-damages will reduce health
g

American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence
Congressional Budget Office, 2004
i
American Association for Justice, The Truth About Defensive Medicine
h
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care providers’ fear of medical malpractice claims. The flaw in this reasoning is that doctors fear
more than merely economic sanctions; a caps-on-damages proposal does absolutely nothing for
the noneconomic costs associated with a malpractice lawsuit (i.e. negative publicity associated
with being involved in a malpractice lawsuit). Considering the fact that these risks cannot
dissolve with a “caps-on-damages tort reform approach,” the practice of defensive medicine will
continue.
An undisputed fact of medical liability is that preventable medical errors contribute to
billions of dollars in health care expenditures. In 2000, the Institute of Medicine disclosed
research regarding the health care system in a report titled “To Err Is Human.” The report
claimed “at least 44,000 people, and perhaps as many as 98,000 people, die in hospitals each
year as a result of medical errors that could have been prevented.”j The Institute of Medicine
reports that the costs associated with these errors are thought to be as high as $29 billion
annually.k Because “preventable medical errors” is a more concrete, realistic concept than
defensive medicine, policy makers ought to focus their attention more effectively on something
known to exist, and on something that, if largely resolved, could have the same fiscal effect as
“eliminating defensive medicinel.”
In attempt to resolve any confusion up to this point, while at the same time not oversimplifying the situation and dichotomizing the diagnosis of the malpractice system, obvious
points can be made. Those that see the system’s flaws, including too many lawsuits and the
inner-workings of defensive medicine as a result of “fear of liability,” argue for a tort reform
approach. Others, those viewing the malpractice system’s flaws as disregarding patient safety
and not working vigorously enough to limit medical error, advocate for more comprehensive
reform approaches. More “comprehensive” reform approaches steer away from tort and litigation
in general, viewing the adversarial process skeptically. They see the reform approaches they
advocate for limiting liability costs in the long run; the argument goes: obviously, if you reduce
the amount of medical error, the amount of liability cases will also subside. Before shifting focus
to the two contending approaches of medical liability reform, and examining their differences,

j

Kohn, L.T., Corrigan J.M., & Donaldson, M.S., To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health Care System
American Association for Justice, The Truth About Defensive Medicine
l
Reducing medical error could directly lower costs by about 30 billion, and indirectly have a large impact as well,
way beyond the fiscal benefits of “eliminating” defensive medicine.
k

Published by KnightScholar, 2013

5

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2012 [2013], Art. 10

176
analyzing points of consensus among scholars, policy makers, and the educated public is
essential to conceptually forming the policy debate.
The medical malpractice tort-run system, as it stands, is problematic—this fact has been
established by anyone that has invested research in the current medical liability system. The
system tries to meet its goals of compensation; deterrence; corrective justice; and efficiency, but
fails miserably in most cases. In respect to corrective justice, advocates of both approaches note
that medical liability fears inhibit quality of care improvements. Proponents of both reform
approaches also agree that the recent medical liability insurance crisis is not a unique experience
of the 21st century. Within the past four decades, experts assert that we have experienced three
medical liability insurance crises: the first in the late 1960s, and early 1970s; the second during
the mid-1980s; and the third crisis occurred approximately from 2002-2005 (Kersh 46–48).
First-Generation Reform Approaches to Medical Liability
Health policy expert Rogan Kersh discusses reform in terms of two categories: firstgeneration approaches and second-generation approaches. First-generation approaches include
reform options such as caps-on-damage awards, whereas second-generation approaches include
reform options like alternative dispute resolution (Kersh 43–44). As the title of the chapter
implies, Kersh discusses the political dimensions of liability reform in his “Medical Malpractice
and the New Politics of Healthcare.” According to Kersh, first-generation approaches are
supported predominantly by policy-makers, while the academic community generally advocate
for second-generation approaches (Kersh 43–67).
The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975 and the Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011m (hereinafter H.R.5) are two
examples of “First-Generation Proposals.” These policies seek to “reduce the excessive burden
the liability system places on the health care delivery system.”n H.R.5 draws on the cause-andeffect relationship medical liability has on the health care system. As the argument goes, medical
liability holds physicians too accountable; as a result, physicians are forced to practice defensive
medicine, and the quality of care improvement is inhibited.o H.R.5 plans to resolve the liability
system’s flaws through imposing limits on medical malpractice litigation through: capping
m

Also referred to as the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2012, because
the proposed bill is still under Congressional consideration and review
n
(HEALTH) Act of 2012, Purpose and Summary
o
(HEALTH) Act of 2012, Background and Need for Legislation

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2012/iss1/10

6

Muller: Medical Liability Reform in the United States

177
awards and attorney fees; modifying the statute of limitations and “collateral source” rule; and
eliminating “joint and several liability.” H.R.5 utilizes research conducted by the Pacific
Institute, a free-market think tank, which estimates the cost of defensive medicine to be $191
billion dollars.p The validity of McQuillan and Abramyan’s research and statistics on defensive
medicine ought to be seriously questioned—not only is the estimate four times larger than some
of the most generous estimates, but their research is based on earlier research that has been
largely refuted and criticized by scholars in the field and the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO). H.R.5 provides a weak refutation to the argument that defensive medicine may be
practiced to increase income, saying that “if an internist orders a CAT scan, the radiologist gets
paid, not the internist.” This rebuttal does not assume income increases at a systemic level; in
other words, hospitals, which are corporations (regardless of our lack of conceptualization as
such)q, may enforce policies that encourage increased income. H.R.5 then makes the assertion
that medical liability fears inhibit quality of care improvements, going on to also say the liability
system fails to deter medical errors or promote patient safety. These points are duly noted by
advocates of second-generation reforms as well. The question is, how will measures taken by
H.R.5, which allegedly lower malpractice premiums for physicians, simultaneously result in
increased disclosure and less medical error? As discussed earlier, it is naïve to reason that simply
lessening the economic consequences a physician will face when disclosing details to a patient
will make the physician more prone to disclosure. After all, the non-economic damages a
physician endures (i.e., negative publicity and image) are not disappearing once a cap-ondamage award is implemented.
Along with the problems already discussed, the congressional Committee on Energy and
Commerce critique H.R.5 in terms of its federal nature. The committee recognizes that the
current state-based systems for dealing with medical malpractice are far from perfect; however,
the committee claims that modifications and improvements need to be made within the context
of this general state-by-state framework. In other words, the national “one-size-fits-all” approach
that H.R.5 endorses will not suffice. Within the dissenting views of a national approach, a valid
point is made—such a new, “…untested legal structure…” has “…little regard for the potential

p
q

McQuillan & Abramyan, Jackpot Justice: The True Cost of America’s Tort System
G. Annas, personal communication, March 9, 2012
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consequences.”r Furthermore, aside from its highly problematic implementation, attempting to
resolve medical malpractice with national legislation is unprecedented—“the principles of
medical malpractice liability and the procedures for the conduct of medical malpractice lawsuits
have [always] been governed by state law.”s
The Committee of Energy and Commerce also critique the causal nature of H.R.5’s
proposition. H.R.5’s logical train-of-thought flows in the following way: implement damage
caps. As a result of damage caps there will be a reduction in premiums, and as an indirect result,
medical error will diminish and high quality care will flourish. Critics of H.R.5 point out the flaw
in the H.R.5 proponents’ reasoning by stating the following:
Yet, data indicate[s] that today, the overall medical liability insurance market
is not in crisis. They also show it is the direct regulation of insurance
companies—and not a cap on non-economic damages (one of the core
elements of H.R.5)—that is responsible for the reductions in insurance
premiums that have been seen.t
In light of what an overwhelming amount of data indicates, in which the above cited data
concurs, caps-on-damages resulting in premium reduction is not realistic, and caps having such
an intended impact is indeterminate at best. Logically, it follows that the causal link between
caps-on-damages and a reduction in medical error is equally weak, if not weaker. Taking this
data into consideration, instead of relying on damage caps to indirectly solve the severe problems
the United States faces with medical error, it makes more sense that reducing medical error
should be legislation’s first step, its direct intention, and reduction in premiums, if at all
influenced by medical malpractice lawsuits, flow from a reduction in medical error.
Problems in terms of constitutionality and fairness arise with H.R.5’s caps-on-damages
approach also. Lawyers representing patient-plaintiffs have argued caps are not only unfair, they
are also unconstitutional. The caps are claimed to be such because they “[discriminate] between
patients with minor medical injuries and those with severe injuries.” The reasoning here is
simple: people with minor injuries have the potential to receive full compensation, whereas
people with more serious injuries might get only a fraction of their owed compensation under
capped damages.u Employing this argument, the caps-on-non-economic-damages have been

r

(HEALTH) Act of 2012, Dissenting Views
(HEALTH) Act of 2012, Dissenting Views
t
(HEALTH) Act of 2012, Dissenting Views
u
Gallegos, A., Caps Under Fire: The Fight for Medical Liability Reform
s
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successfully declared unconstitutional by some states’ Supreme Courts, due to the fact that the
statutes are inherently discriminatory. Maxwell J. Mehlman, a prominent scholar in the health
policy field, advances another argument discussing the statues’ unfairness.
… [It] seems unfair to limit the recoveries of one class of victims—those
injured by malpractice—while permitting other tort claimants to recover more
fully. Why should someone whose leg is mistakenly amputated, for example,
get less than someone who loses a leg when they are run over by a negligent,
insured motorist (153).
As Mehlman describes in a couple of sentences above, caps-on-damages in medical malpractice
tort cases are unfair because they prevent a victim of injury from receiving the same
compensation they might have otherwise gotten had the tort been of a different nature (e.g. as the
example used above proposes, compensation resulting from the negligence of a motorist).
For the reasons listed and described above, first-generation reform approaches to medical
malpractice are less promising than the latter, second-generation reform approaches. While the
different first-generation approaches to reform are limited, most are simply different variations
of damage cap proposals, second-generation reform approaches, which position medical error as
their top priority, are large in number and diverse. Equally important to note is that secondgeneration approaches are not mutually exclusive; in fact, advocates of each approach list other
reform policies that ought to be adopted in conjunction with what they are discussing. In the next
section of this paper, contending second-generation reform options are described, and the section
concludes with a proposal to policy makers of the best second-generation reform package.
Second-Generation Reform Proposals: An Abundance of Reform Proposals That Solve the
Right Problems
Unlike the simple solution first-generation reform approach, damage caps, secondgeneration reforms vary a great deal specifically in terms of the way they aim to resolve their
fundamental concern, which is medical error. The various proposals’ degree of projected
influence also varies significantly. This paper considers some of the most popular secondgeneration proposals; these include litigation reform; alternative-dispute resolution; and
enterprise liability reform.
Litigation Reform
It makes sense to first discuss reform proposals that aim at altering the litigation system;
before discussing more drastic measures, let us first discuss the least intrusive reform approach,
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and the one most similar to the current system. Catherine T. Struve suggests the first measure
that needs to be taken, one that at least seventeen states have already adopted, is implementing
certificate-of-merit provisions (174). Such a provision would ensure that the case a plaintiff’s
lawyer files is potentially meritorious. The certificate to file would be provided once an expert
approves of the case at hand.
Another litigation reform measure, also directed at experts, would change the nature of
expert testimony. As Struve suggests, much expert testimony relies on medical experts
describing what they would have done in a given situation, as opposed to what the general health
care professional would have done; litigation reform needs to address this issue and provide
modifications that would allow for a more robust systemic analysis.
Other litigation reform provisions take the importance of the judicial function into
account. Emphasis on the judicial function is important, especially considering their important
roles as gatekeepers throughout the course of a trial. If judges are to employ tests that assess
technical or scientific expert testimony, the judge needs to understand the basic concepts of
scientific evidence. Some people have advocated for specialized health courts that would only
hear medical malpractice cases (Struve 176). However, the problem with this idea is that the
selection and retention of judges may become too politicized, and interest groups’ interests may
coincide with judicial decision-making. Yes, the same argument could be made with regard to
general courts, but by its nature a specialized court would be more prone to such influence.
Instead, “specialized divisions within a state’s trial court of general jurisdiction would be a better
option,” claims Struve (177). As judges rotate into this division of the trial court, they receive
special training through a “continuing judicial education” program that states could implement.
Considering the above proposals, litigation reform, in general terms, attempts to address
the claims process, the evidence process, and judicial decision-making, respectively. While
reforms in these three areas are all necessary, these reforms alone are insufficient. The litigation
reform measures laid out would aim to fulfill the reform goals of compensation and efficiency,
but how would these policies significantly reduce medical error? Furthermore, this reform policy
fails to consider the fact that a litigation process, in general, will discourage real change in
medical liability from occurring; as discussed earlier, litigation, an adversarial process by nature,
does not encourage disclosure—and disclosure is absolutely necessary if we are to see a
significant reduction in medical error.
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Struve’s suggestions are thoughtful and well noted. Trial reform is attractive, because it is
a “less invasive procedure,” compared to other second-generation alternatives. Trial reform
should be further researched and considered as a legitimate end to a better medical liability
system. However, in light of the reservations already made about litigation, it is important not to
presuppose that the court remains the predominant institution in instances of medical
malpractice. In other words, litigation needs to be seen as a subsequent method of resolution, and
not the primary approach to reform.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
The American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) sees the medical liability
system for what it is. The organization understands that a majority of the money medical
professionals pay out in malpractice cases go to the costs of litigation. In light of their
understanding, these physicians wish to see broad-based liability reforms; in their opinion,
second-generation reforms have the ability to fairly compensate patients while reducing liability
costs and increasing patient safety. The AAOS argues for alternative dispute resolution (ADR)—
or “non-litigious means of resolving conflict.”
In the article “The Limits of Apology Laws,” published by the Hastings Center Report,
Rebecca Dresser discusses how an initiative implemented to reduce medical error and apology
laws have had a questionable impact. Medical error is reduced by coming to terms with, and
discussing, mistakes (i.e. disclosure), and proposing ways to prevent those mistakes from
occurring again in the future. Malpractice lawsuits deter physicians from pursuing disclosure.
Theoretically, apology laws encourage physicians to disclose information to their patients,
because the law prevents an apology or a sympathetic expression from being used as evidence of
negligence in court. As Dresser points out, the majority of states that adopt apology laws only
have provisions that “eliminate expressions of sympathy, not admissions of fault…” Dresser’s
point illustrates the limits of apology laws; her point also implies that disclosure and litigation
are mutually exclusive concepts. If methods other than litigation were embraced, however, and
apologies were encouraged, results might include increased disclosure and more compensated
patients. One critique of these ADR methods is that widespread disclosure and compensation
would result in too much money being paid out. This point is well noted; however, are we to
assume disclosure will always result in large payouts?
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Research conducted within the past decade has made the point clear that patients mostly
sue for non-monetary reasons. In light of these findings, ADR has become more prominent and
popular in recent years. Patients sue mostly for disclosure (they want to discover what exactly
happened to them), desire for an apology, and prevention of future errors to other patients.
Different forms of ADR make these desires of patients possible, while compensating patients for
experienced injuries at a much lower rate than would be the case with litigation. With mediation,
patients get the remedy sought—an explanation and apology—while physicians get the
satisfaction of a clear conscience, and the learning experience. The nature of litigation’s
adversarial process is that there is a winner and a loser; someone at the end of the trial will be
satisfied, while the other person is unsatisfied and will most likely become resentful of the legal
system. ADR creates the possibility that both parties will walk away content with what was
discussed, and what deal was obtained.
Enterprise Liability Reform
A well-known and frequently cited statistic released by the Institute of Medicine claims
“as many as ninety-eight thousand people die in hospitals each year as a result of medical errors
that could have been prevented.” A less familiar fact: systematic malfunctions are responsible for
ninety percent of that medical error.v The keyword “systematic” means that the medical errors
are a result of the system, the institution, as opposed to the individual, the physician. On this
basis alone, if we are to assume the Institute of Medicine’s figure to be correct, the current
medical liability system is wrong in targeting the physician.
Bovbjerg and Berenson claim “[the] most important legal rationale for imposing liability
on physicians and other medical providers is that doing so deters substandard practice.” In light
of the fact that information already discussed refutes the deterrent effect of liability, imposing
liability on physicians does not make much sense. It is particularly interesting that while a broad
array of research mentions the predominance of systematic errors as opposed to individual errors
in medical error, both first- and second- generation reform policies take the existence of the
“physician”-defendant for granted— caps-on-damages, litigation reform, and alternative dispute
resolution, are three examples of reforms that all fail to address the question of who the
defendant is: an individual or an institution? A comprehensive approach to medical liability
reform needs to, at the very least, reconsider what entity should be held accountable for medical
v

Obama and Clinton, Making Patient Safety the Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform
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error. Enterprise liability, considering the high proportion of systematic error involved in medical
error, argues for the liability system to make health care organizations (e.g. hospitals) the
respondent.
According to Michelle Mello, professor of law and public health at Harvard University,
"[p]hysician insurers consider it infeasible to individually experience rate their subscribers.
Physicians are sued too infrequently, and their claims experience varies too much over each
three- or five-year period, to make experience rating actuarially feasible” (14). Institutions that
have adopted enterprise liability, however, have insurance premiums that are experience-rated,
because at the institutional level, experience-rating is practical. Experience-rating is a very
attractive feature of enterprise liability; a reduction in insurance premiums as a result of safe
practice gives a health care institution just another reason to take patient safety very seriously—
in this case, an economic incentive is present, enough to encourage any corporation (such as a
hospital). Although the public does not like to consider them in such terms, hospitals are
corporations, and their economic interests and perspectives regarding the administration of health
care could facilitate great measures to improve patient safety. Hospitals with enterprise liability
now employ workers to assess the degree of quality improvement occurring at the institution,
and they implement policies that further encourage quality improvement.
Hospitals, the institutions themselves, need to lead campaigns for reducing medical error,
because systems can do more than any individual can—“health care organizations are in a far
better position than individual providers to see opportunities to improve patient safety and to act
on those insights.”w Disclosure needs to be enthusiastically encouraged if we are to see great
reductions in medical error. With respect to enterprise liability, Philip G. Peters, Jr. says the
following:
[Enterprise liability] in malpractice law will help hospitals create ‘blame free’
cultures that encourage open discussion of errors. As long as physicians remain
at risk of individual malpractice liability, they can legitimately scoff at the
notion that disclosure will be ‘blame free.’x
When mistakes are made, the institutions need to take the blame. The system consuming the
responsibility for medical error prevents physicians and other health care professionals from
having to claim responsibility themselves, making them reluctant to the discussion of errors.
w
x

Peters, Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liability
Peters, Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liability

Published by KnightScholar, 2013

13

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2012 [2013], Art. 10

184
A Comprehensive Reform Proposal
A policy proposal with a one-size-fits-all approach, assuming the liability concerns of all
states could be treated with the same solution, would be just as flawed as first-generation
reform’s federal legislation H.R.5. With that being said, the policy recommendations provided
here should be analyzed in a broad manner, understanding the intended goals each portion of the
proposal is trying to uphold.
What conditions does the medical liability reform system need to fulfill in order to be
considered “successful?” If the goals of reducing medical error, upholding a patient’s right to
safety and compensation, and resolving problems with liability insurance premiums are
adequately met, the reform proposal is adequate—and may very well become a “success.”
Absolutely essential to reducing medical error is disclosure; therefore, unless reform measures
encourage professionals to disclose error, reform will not be successful. Reform measures will be
equally flawed if they attempt to resolve fiscal concerns and in the process, limit patients’ legal
rights (i.e., caps-on-damages). Adequate and efficient compensation is also important and needs
to be included in proposals; compensation needs to be negotiated outside the court room if
possible, because litigation costs increase the amount paid out significantly, which increases
health expenditures and ultimately, insurance premiums.
In prescribing liability policy, it makes sense to begin with how health care professionals
are being insured. Medical liability reform proposals that wish to assure success need to include
an enterprise liability solution, with experience-rating whenever feasible. Adopting enterprise
liability ensures physicians they will not have to deal with the heavy financial burdens of the
liability process, and that their time will not be taken from them. With these two burdens taken
into account and resolved, physicians will be less prone to keep from disclosing errors.
Disclosing errors at a more frequent rate might not only reduce medical error, but also might
decrease the number of malpractice suits being filed. After all, “malpractice suits often result
when an unexpected adverse outcome is met with a lack of empathy from physicians and a
withholding of essential information.”y Adopting a liability system that could actuarially handle
experience-rating, like enterprise liability, would also provide yet another reason for health care
organizations to make patient safety its top priority.

y
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For the reasons listed above, under the “Alternative Dispute Resolution” heading, it
makes sense for litigation to be a secondary instrument in disputes, and for some form of ADR to
be used first. A no-fault liability payout system may be a good approach to compensation under
an alternative dispute resolution. The “no fault” approach to compensation utilizes an
administrative agency or “health court”z to evaluate claims without reference to whether
negligence occurred. Critics oppose the notion of no fault because they feel creating such low
standards for compensation would not work—there is no way the number of payouts would be
affordable. Advocates of the no-fault approach argue that even though it compensates a larger
percentage of injured patients, it also generates lower overhead costs, and the money used to
otherwise pay for litigation could go to compensating injury. Although a no-fault system is
vastly different from the current liability compensation framework, the policy seems feasible and
is worthy of consideration. All in all, no-fault liability (and systems similar to it), with quick and
efficient payout systems, need to be endorsed by liability reform proposals. Admittedly, more
experience with such administrative models is needed; more experimentation in general is
necessary for no-fault liability and the alternative compensation approaches it competes with.
Predictable, reliable compensation for medical error depends on injury compensation
tables and guidelines. Legislation enacted could make it that experts—including actuaries,
economists, physicians, insurers, and judges—establish tables of injury cost data. Although
every injury is different, general guidelines, regardless of whether they have a binding or nonbinding effect, produce compensation that is more efficient and predictable, as opposed to
arbitrary and slow-paced. Tables that illustrate the average an injured patient receives in relation
to their injury, facilitates in the negotiation process and prevents patients from being under- or
over-compensated. Considering no evidence suggests medical malpractice is malicious in nature,
compensation tables would not consider “punitive damages” when appraising injuries.
Compensation tables ensure, as George A. Huber puts it, that in most cases “settlement is only a
matter of using predetermined information to establish the compensation necessary to cover
damages resulting from injury” (Huber 41–43). Because the injury suffered is only one element
in the compensation equation, and the other elements vary greatly from patient-to-patient, tables
should be used as guidelines as opposed to being used as mandates.

z
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The final policy recommendation this paper chooses to discuss is seldom talked over in
medical liability reform proposals. Nonetheless, physician work hours, and the influence this has
on avoidable errors committed, requires our attention. In Mark R. Mercurio’s A Day Too Long:
Rethinking Physician Work Hours, an article published by a bioethics institution, The Hastings
Center in its Hastings Report, Mercurio considers the logic of long work hours for physicians.
Mercurio claims there is ample evidence that long work hours can lead to increased chances of
medical and surgical error.aa In light of this evidence, residents’ and fellows’ work hours have
been significantly reduced. Mercurio explains that the current limits still seem inconsistent with
“what is known about human physiology and performance,” however, “[in] any case, the present
limit is an improvement over the old system.”bb Surprisingly to Mercurio, despite concerns and
an eventual limit on residents’ and fellows’ hours in the hospital, there are no hour rules
regarding attending physicians. Ironically, the workers that have no hour limitations are the
oldest, and those with “final responsibility for patient management in the unit.”cc
The rationale for no time limitation may be “‘continuity of care’—trying to avoid passing
a patient from one physician to another.”dd Yet the same concerns with respect to residents’
assignments to patients was trumped by the greater concern of declining performance and
medical error; it seems difficult to understand why continuity of care would not be trumped by
concerns of medical error for physician work hours as well. Mercurio makes his point clear when
he concludes by saying, “if allowing a twenty-eight-year-old resident to work around the clock
and beyond is unsafe for patients…then allowing a fifty- or sixty-year-old attending to do so
makes little sense.”ee All of the safe-practice standards and paper pushing in the world is not
going to resolve medical error if physicians are incompetent due to exhaustion. Medical liability
reform, in addition to resolving inefficiency at the systemic level, needs to seriously consider
implementing legislation that limits physician work hours under certain circumstances.
The Hurdles of Implementation
Regardless of how great the intended prospects of a given liability reform proposal is,
reforms obviously require implementation, a mechanism that puts the policy into effect. Some
great reform proposals are disregarded and do not receive much appraise at all, because of their
aa
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inability to be implemented. Some reforms that have great prospects, and receive great reviews
during experimentation, still have trouble with being implemented. The reasons that reform
proposals have trouble being implemented are plentiful.
Second-generation reform proposals have difficulty receiving the attention they deserve
because medical malpractice is chiefly understood as a “legal problem.” Too often, medical
malpractice is viewed primarily as a legal problem, and attempts to resolve the problems are
aimed at methods of reducing litigation. For this reason, first-generation reform proposals, i.e.
caps-on-damages, have been more successful than second-generation reform proposals.
Reducing litigation as the intended goal, however, fails to recognize medical error in itself is
intrinsically a problem, not just medical error’s impact on the litigation system. Research that
suggests up to 98,000 avoidable deaths occur is being ignored. Perhaps because they take the
harsh realities of medical error for granted, policy-makers do not see reducing medical error as
the top priority. Medical malpractice needs to be understood by policy makers as a “health policy
problem” first-and-foremost. Focusing effort on the adversarial legal process will not help
medical professionals learn from their mistakes; the only impact litigation will have on
physicians is building more resentment towards the medical liability system.
To really understand the true difficulty of implementing malpractice reform proposals,
the politics of malpractice need to be discussed. Rogan Kersh provides an interesting, insightful,
and unconventional perspective of liability reform by discussing medical malpractice’s political
nature. Malpractice policies, like all policies, are influenced by interest groups. Some interest
groups that benefit greatly from the current malpractice system are reluctant to endorse reform
measures, and others go so far as using their fiscal capabilities to ensure reform measures will
not be taken. President Bush made this obvious point during a 2004 speech, saying “trial lawyers
pursuing their own agenda have continued to block this much-needed reform” (Kersh 60). The
effects of malpractice reform on their profession are obviously a concern of considerable weight
for plaintiff lawyers. First-generation reforms limit the amount some plaintiff-victims will be
compensated, which therefore decreases the amount the plaintiff’s lawyer can make off of the
case. Second-generation reforms go as far as considering alternatives to litigation, which
obviously could greatly impact medical malpractice injury lawyers across the country.
American policy-making, in general, also has something to do with the limits of
implementation. “Incrementalism,” a term adopted by Rogan Kersh, “explains most American
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policy making—including health policy. Ambitious malpractice reforms, in this perspective, will
almost inevitably be whittled down to minor changes, as has happened in most health care
debates over the past thirty years” (65). Albeit very skeptical, this view of implementation makes
a valid point: until the vitality of broad reform measures is understood, only minor changes to the
current system will be implemented. First-generation reforms are very mild with respect to the
changes they prescribe, and because of this, they are more likely than second-generation reforms
to be implemented.
Because all states have different experiences with medical malpractice, it is important
that malpractice reform be implemented at the state level. A one-size-fits-all approach to reform,
whether it is first- or second-generation reform, is not the correct way to proceed. The
Affordable Care Act, legislation the Obama Administration has been advocating for, will in
effect nationalize health care in the United States. If the bill, which is under Supreme Court
consideration now for allegedly being unconstitutional by nature, is upheld, nationalized medical
liability reform might be worthy of reconsideration. But as of now, if the federal government
were to create legislation that reflected some sort of second-generation reform proposal, judicial
action would be likely to follow (Kersh 66). H.R.5, the HEALH Act of 2012, is one example of
national legislation that, if it became law, may be struck down for going beyond the reach of the
Commerce Clause (the Commerce Clause is how national malpractice reform would be justified)
(66).
The final issue this paper addresses can be understood by asking the question: can we
mandate compassion? Ron Paterson asks this exact question in Can We Mandate Compassion, an
essay he wrote published in The Hastings Report. Paterson, a former Health and Disability
Commissioner of New Zealand, wrestled with this question as a result of a New Zealand statute
that demands compassion. Although his article is not directly related to the issue of medical
malpractice, his inquiry forces us to reflect on, and perhaps come to terms with, the limits of the
law. Yes, there is a chance, as small as it may be, the legislature could enact legislation that
embraces all of the concerns and viewpoints of second-generation reform. Even if the best
attempts to reduce medical error were implemented, does that ensure change will, in fact, occur?
Reform proposals that encourage disclosure are valuable. The thought is that an increased
level of disclosure will result in less future error. In most cases this antecedent-consequent
relationship holds true. Disclosure, however, does not simultaneously lead to less error;
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disclosure enables physicians to learn, and from the experience, errors of that kind do not
reoccur. Turning medical error into a learning experience for physicians is important. This
learning experience, however, is capable of being hindered if physicians are not receptive to the
mistakes being made. The “culture of medicine,” as it stands, encourages physicians to
rationalize and excuse their mistakes, not to embrace them and encourage improvement. If we
are to see a serious reduction in medical error, mistakes need to be confronted and discussed in a
passionate manner no legislation can ensure. Certainly, for medical liability’s sake, the “culture
of medicine” needs to change—medical schools, teaching hospitals, along with other educational
institutions, need to emphasize the process of atonement through self-improvement.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to discuss the highly problematic nature of the current medical
liability system, resolve some of the most common misconceptions medical malpractice is prone
to, and suggest reform measures that address the key concerns of the current medical liability
system. More specifically, this paper attempted to focus on what issues are important, and the
mechanisms by which these concerns could be addressed, and perhaps even resolved. It cannot
be stressed enough that reform proposals, regardless of how great their resolutions are, all face
the reality of implementation.
Finally, the need for more experimentation has been discussed rather briefly. It should be
made clear, that conducting more experiments on the various reform proposals is absolutely
essential to correctly resolving the medical malpractice system. If proposals with little influence
are implemented, it will be a waste of both money and time, and the flawed liability system will
continue to operate in a dysfunctional manner. The empirical research that experimentation
provides will contribute more insight and guidance as to what contending reform options are
most suitable for the medical malpractice system.
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